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doors of the state courts to non-complying foreign corporations is founded on no determination that the Mississippi
courts are administratively inadequate to dispose of such
suits. Certainly the Mississippi statute expresses, rather, a
policy judgment to the effect that a foreign corporation not
meeting the standards prescribed by the state of Mississippi
should not be accorded the privilege of using the state's
courts.30 It was this type of determination that the Erie
case consigned to the exclusive power of Mississippi. No
independent judgment was intended to be allowed the federal court3' which should therefore have refused to entertain the case, precisely as a state court would have refused.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
A perennial dogma asserts that when a government
corporate agency appears in court it enjoys a preferred
legal status. That preference in its most extreme form denies all amenability to suit. But even if suability is
determined, preferential treatment still may be accorded by
limiting the kinds of liability to which the agency is subject,
or the burdensome incidents of suit which it would otherwise
bear. In either case the judicially-created notion of preference is rooted in the historic concept that suit does not lie

against an unconsenting sovereign.'
30. Disregard of state statutes denying access to courts of the
state to non-complying foreign corporations has been held to be subversive of a "policy [of the state] to protect [its] citizens against the
fraud and imposition of insolvent and unreliable corporations, and
to place them in an attitude to be reached by legal process from .. .
courts [of the state] in favor of citizens having cause of complaint."
Alabama W. R. R. v. Talley-Bates Const. Co., 162 Ala. 396, 50 So. 341,
342 (1909).
31. The Federal Constitution is, of course, prescriptive of the limits
beyond which a state may not go in restricting the jurisdiction of the
courts of its own system. See McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R.,
292 U. S.230, 233 (1934). Among the relevant limiting provisions are
the contracts clause, the full faith and credit clause, the privileges and
immunities clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection
clause. Obviously an unconstitutional state jurisdictional statute can
be of no effect in restricting the jurisdiction of a federal court sitting
in a diversity case.
1. Except for the constitutional denial of federal courts' jurisdiction over suits by citizens of one state against a sovereign sister
state (U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XI) the doctrine of sovereign immunity
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In the era when governmental activities were restricted

in number and scope the federal courts were most concerned
with whether a government corporation could be sued under
any circumstances. 2 But following the tremendous expansion of government functions in the Thirties the question

shifted. Not only did the courts abandon those conceptual 3
and functional- tests which they had once used to discover
has always stemmed from judicial sources.
See Walkup, Immunity
of the State from Suit by Its Citizens, 36 GEo. L. J. 310, 318-22 (1948) ;
Street, Tort Liability of the State, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 341-343 (1949).
The dissent in the cornerstone case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419,
427 (U. S. 1793) represents the traditionally accepted position.
2. See Coffman, Legal Status of Government Corporations, 7 FED.
BAR Ass'N J. 389 (1946).
3. Courts have sometimes said that a government corporation is
amenable to suit because it is a "separate entity" not partaking of
the insulating immunity of the sovereign. See Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (U. S. 1824)
where Chief Justice Marshall states that "The Planters' Bank of
Georgia is not the State of Georgia, although the state holds an interest in it." Cf. Lindgren v. United States Shipping Board Merchant
Fleet Corp., 55 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1932).
4. The technique commonly applied in determining a governmental
agency's suability is a functional test which distinguishes governmental
or public activities from proprietary or private activities. The Planters'
Bank case, supra note 3, is considered the originator of this distinction.
See the collection of cases citing it as a precedent at 83 L. Ed. 802
(1939).
The tenor of that opinion is revealed by Marshall's familiar
dictum that it is ". . . a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as
concerns the transactions of the company, of its sovereign character,
and takes that of a private citizen." 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (U. S. 1824).
Under this distinction corporate form is not controlling. Although
many courts have determined their jurisdiction over a government
corporation without considering the governmental-proprietary distinction, no case prior to the congressional intent cases has been found
which held the distinction immaterial. Certainly many cases have said
that suability of a federal corporation depends upon its proprietary
character. See, e.g., Providence Engineering Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding Corp., 294 FED. 641 (2d Cir. 1923). Cf. Lyle v. National Home
for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, 170 Fed. 842 (6th Cir. 1909) which
holds a government corporation authorized to sue and be sued immune
from a suit in tort on the ground that the corporation was organized
as a charitable organization, which is a governmental function.
The only apparent qualification of the functional test as decisive
of corporate suability lies in the area of state taxation. It has been
contended that whether a state may tax the activities of a federal
corporation depends upon the corporation's function, i.e., if it is performing a proprietary task it is subject to state taxation.
See
Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations, 21 VA. L. REv. 465,
475 (1935) [the author argues that M'Cullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316 (1819) merely prohibits a discriminatory state tax.] The firmly
established doctrine in state taxation cases is to the contrary, however, and in these cases courts usually deny the existence of such a
thing as action by a governmental corporation in a proprietary capacity. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314
U. S. 94 (1941) (The Court upheld congressional provisions exempting
from state sales taxes those activities of federal land banks which
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suability, but under a newly formulated test which made
amenability to suit turn on congressional intention,5 judicial
inquiry sought only to discover whether Congress had abandoned particular limitations on the kinds of liability to which
a government corporation could be subjected.6 The presumption of preferential treatment was not instantly dispelled.
But the change in emphasis, coupled with a tendency to find
furthered their lending functions. It considered the argument that
these lending functions were proprietary and hence taxable a misconception of the "nature of the federal government with respect to every
function which it performs." Id. at 102).
The area of inter-governmental tax immunity, while it impinges
on the area of federal corporate immunity from suit, is a separate
problem. Its doctrinal basis and evolution cannot be discussed here.
See generally Rice, Problems of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities
Arising out of Federal Contract Termination and Property Disposal, 54
YALE L. J. 665 (1945).
5. Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935) enunciated
this doctrine which holds that whether federal agencies are subject
to suit is a question of congressional intent, discoverable not only from
the words of the statute, but, where necessary, from the legislative
purposes and organization of the agency. This doctrine, at least
superficially, does away with the intricate verbal distinctions inherent
in the functional test of suability. Probably no definition adequately
could distinguish a proprietary from a governmental function. One
writer suggests that ".

.

. the fundamental distinction to be drawn is

between the government on the one hand as the regulator of acts
of individuals and the helper of those in want and on the other hand
the government as a producer of goods and services." Thurston, Government ProprietaryCorporations,21 VA. L. REV. 465, 500, 501 (1935).
Courts have found to be significant such factors as whether the government enters a competitive field [see e.g., United States v. Thomas,
107 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1939)] or whether the government enters the
field for gain [see, e.g., Carver v. Haynes, 37 F. Supp. 607 (S. D. Calif.
1941)].
6. Thus, in Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935)
the Court found an express waiver of immunity in the Federal Farm
Loan Act's provision that the federal land banks should have power
"to sue and be sued, complain, interplead, and defend, in any court.
as fully as natural persons." Accordingly, the Court considered its
inquiry narrowed to the question "whether liability to suit includes by
implication judicial process of attachment and execution, which are
usual incidents of suits against natural persons." Id. at 232. Congressional intention to include amenability to attachment was discovered from the combined presence of these factors: the federal land
banks had certain enumerated characteristics in common with private
business corporations; remedies, afforded creditors of the banks were
identical with those given creditors of privately owned joint stock land
banks; express tax exemption not enjoyed by joint stock land banks
was granted the federal land banks whereas Congress was silent about
attachment, to which joint stock land banks were subject; the phrase
"as fully as natural persons" was also used in the National Banking
Act, which was subsequently amended expressly to prohibit attachment.
Throughout its opinion the Court makes clear it is seeking evidence
which will show whether Congress intended to prohibit attachment because it would interfere with the functions the land banks were set
up to perform.
...
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general liability except in the face of express prohibitions,7
indicated the judicial responsiveness to a new "climate of

opinion-" one which had brought government immunities
into disfavor., It was fair to assume from decisions of the
past decade that theories regarding a federal corporation's
legal status were being reshaped, extending liability apace
with the changed and expanded role undertaken by the government.9 But this trend was abruptly halted by the Supreme
Court's decision in FCIC v. Merrill, decided last Term. 10
In that case an Idaho farmer sougHt to hold the Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation 1 liable on a contract of insurance which was issued by a corporation agent in direct, al12
though unwitting, violation of an administrative regulation
7. See, e.g., Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S.

242, 245 (1940)

".

.

. [I]f the general authority to 'sue and be sued'

is to be delineated by implied exceptions, it must be shown that
certain types of suits are not consistent with the statutory or constitutional scheme, that an implied restriction of the general authority
is necessary to avoid grave interference with the performance of a
governmental function, or that for other reasons it was plainly the purY ose of Congress to use the 'sue and be sued' clause in a narrow sense."
nder the congressional intent approach corporate form is of little significance. The agency involved in the Burr case was not incorporated,
but the Court dealt with it as it had incorporated agencies. It is by no
means the first case to treat an unincorporated agency the same as an
incorporated agency. See Mosher, The Legal Status of the Federal
Housing Administration and the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, 10
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 670 (1942).
8. See Frankfurter, J., in Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 391 (1939).
Cf. Hughes, C. J., in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. A. Meniham Corp., 312 U. S. 81, 84
(1941): "In the Keifer Case we did not find it necessary to trace
to its origin the doctrine of the exceptional freedom of the United
States from legal responsibility, but we observed that 'because the
doctrine gives the government a privileged position, it has been appropriately confined.'" A harbinger of these views was the statement of a lower federal court that "it is repugnant to the American
theory of sovereignty that an instrumentality of the sovereign shall
have all the rights and advantages of a trading corporation, and the
ability to sue, and yet be itself immune from suit, and be able to contract with others, or to injure others, confident that no redress may
be had against it as a matter of right, but only, if at all, as a matter
of the favor of the sovereign." Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United
States Sugar Equalization Board, 268 Fed. 575, 587 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
9. See REP. ATT'Y GEN. COMM. AD. PRoc. 7-24 (1941). For a discussion of the expanded utilization of the corporate device to accomplish government functions, see GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 215-

222 (2d ed. 1947).
10. 332 U. S. 380 (1947).
11. The Corporation was established to provide an "all-risk"
insurance plan. See 81 CONG. REc. 2893 (1937); 82 CONG. REC.
1097, 1098, 1122 (1938); 24 VA. L. REV. 914 (1938).
12. The regulation provided that spring wheat reseeded on
winter wheat acreage would not be an insurable crop. 10 FED.

crop
489,
1945
REG.
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published in the Federal Register. The money judgment affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court 13 was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. Although it was assumed
that on the facts a private corporation would be bound by
the contract because of the farmer's reliance on the apparent
authority of the agent,14 the Court denied that such estoppel
could be set up against a federal corporation. Two grounds
were relied on for the decision: One invoked the authority of
previous cases; the other announced that publication of administrative regulations in the Federal Register gives binding notice to all who deal with the government. On both
points Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion placed major reliance on verbal rubric.
Of the three cases cited for the proposition that no governmental agency is bound by its agents' unauthorized acts,
the Utah Power's case rests on the very governmentalproprietary distinction which the Merrill case itself repudiates.', There the Court was asked to hold that the United
States, suing to assert its rights in public land, was bound
by an alleged oral agreement of its agents with a state-incorporated utility that the utility should -be allowed indefinitely to occupy the land. A dictum cited as authority in
the Merrill ease stated that "the United States is neither
bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an ...

agreement to do .

.

. what the law does not

sanction or permit.'117 Factually the Utah Power case is quite
1591 (1945). Neither the local agent, the regional office nor the
farmer-applicant had actual knowledge of the regulation. Following
destruction of the wheat by drought the farmer applied for compensation for his loss. Upon the corporation's refusal to compensate suit

was instigated in an Idaho trial court.
13. Merrill v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 67 Idaho 196, 174
P.2d 834 (1946).
14. 1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 8, 159 (1933).
15. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389
(1917).
16. "It is too late in the day to urge that the Government is just
another private litigant, for purposes of charging it with liability,
whenever it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private
enterprise or engages in competition with private ventures. Government is not partly public or partly private. .

. ."

Federal Crop In-

surance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 383 (1947).
17. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 409
(1917). The defendant-utility also argued that the United States was
estopped because its agents, knowing of the use to which the land
had been put, by failing to object thereto impliedly acquiesced in that
use so as to bind the United States. The Court overturned this argument because "As a general rule, laches or neglect of duty on the part
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unlike the Merrill case, where the FCIC was sued on the gen-

eral type of contract which it was authorized to make as
part of its normal business. Besides having highly dubious
applicability to the Merrill facts, the quoted statement is
itself not well enough buttressed to stand as an established
18
proposition.
The second case cited" in support of the proposition of
non-estoppel concerned the assertion of certain investors in
farm loan bonds that the government was estopped from
taxing realized capital gains because of the investors' reliance
on statements of the Federal Farm Loan Board that such
bonds and income thereon were tax free. The reliance upon
the statements was held ineffective, in part 2 because the
agency, having no authority in any degree to make tax representations, an exclusive Treasury function, could not estop
the United States "even by an affirmative undertaking to
waive or surrender a public right.'" 21 This case, too, is factually remote from Merrill; it is at least doubtful that the
ordinary rules of agency, had they been applied, would have
established the liability of the government.
The third case, which is cited as general authority, was
decided in 1868.22 In it suit had been brought on unpaid
bills of exchange which had been accepted without authority
by the Secretary of War. 3 The Court refused to allow reof officers of the government is no defense to a suit by it to enforce
a public right. .. . A suit by the United States to enforce and maintain its policy respecting lands which it holds in trust for all the people
stands upon a different plane . . . from the ordinary private suit to
regain title to real property."
Ibid. The government was suing
here in its sovereign capacity [see Fowler, Federal Power to Own and
Operate Railroads in Peace Time, 33 HARV. L. REV. 775, 782 (1920)],
and it is on this fact that the dictum rests.
18. The cases cited in support of this proposition of non-estoppel
are disdussed in Note, Governmental Immunities-A Study in Misplaced
Solicitude, 16 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 128, 135-137 (1948), where if iq concluded that "All but one (and that nearly a century and a half old) of
these cases are thus lacking in one or the other of the elements necessary to an equitable estoppel ....
Yet this tottering line of cases is the
sum of the precedent that sustains the Merrill ruling."
19. United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60 (1940).
20. The Court also disallowed the contention because the Board's
vague statements about the taxable character of the bonds and income
did not approach a uniform and long standing administrative interpretation to which the Court would defer.
21. United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 70 (1940).
22. In re Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666 (U. S. 1868).
23. The Court concluded that "...
as there can be no lawful occasion
for any department of the government, or for any of its officers, or
agents, to accept drafts drawn on them, under any statute or other law
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covery against the United States by the holders in due course
because under the then current rules of law recovery could
not be had against a private person 4 and the Court declined
to hold the government ". . . to a more rigid rule, in this respect, than a private individual.

' 25

Comment upon the ap-

propriateness of the use of such a case is unnecessary.
The Merrill opinion reveals the Court deciding a modern
agricultural insurance problem on the basis of principles pronounced in totally unrelated circumstances: the assertion of
public right in public land; the exercise of the power to tax
income; and the applications of the peculiar rules of law
governing negotiable paper. Unlike the Court's practicalminded decisions of the current decade governmental contractual liability in the Merrill case was not denied because of
inconsistency with the statutory scheme, 2 6 or of grave inter27
ference with the performance of a governmental function,
or proof that Congress used a suability clause in a narrow
sense.

28

now known to us, such acceptances cannot bind the government."
at 681.
24.

"

.

.

in

Id.

each case, the person dealing with the agent . . .

must, at his peril, see that the paper on which he relies comes within
the power under which the agent acts. And this applies to every person
who takes the paper afterwards; for it is to be kept in mind that the
protection which commercial usage throws around negotiable paper,
cannot be used to establish the authority by which it was originally
issued. These principles are well established in regard to the transactions of individuals. They are equally applicable to those of the Government." Id. at 676 [Italics supplied.] But cf. Cooke v. United
States, 91 U. S. 389 (1875).
25. In re Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 681 (U. S. 1869).
26. It would seem thal recovery on the insurance contract would
be highly compatible with the statutory scheme. The Corporation was
set up to provide crop, insurance which private companies considered
too great a risk. See note 11 supra. The avowed protective endeavor
is defeated by the Merrill ruling.
27. The Court intimates that to allow recovery in this instance
would establish a dangerous precedent of judicial disregard of the
"conditions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury."
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, ,332 U. S. 380, 385 (1947).
It is questionable whether the public treasury would be bankrupted
if compensation were allowed in this sort of case. See Note, Governmental Immunities-A Study in Misplaced Solicitude, 16 U. oF CHI.
L. REv. 128, 137 (1948).
28. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation may

"...

sue and

be sued in its corporate name in any court of competent jurisdiction,
State or Federal: Provided, that no attachment, injunction, garnishment, or other similar process, mense or final, ,shall be issued against
the Corporation or its property. . . ." 52 STAT. 73 (1938), 7 U. S. C.
§ 1506 (d) (1946).
Compare the Court's analysis 'of the suability
clause in the Priddy case, supra, note 6.
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Nor can the Court's decision be considered either searching or practical in the second ground on which it rests: the
effect of publication of administrative regulations in the Federal Register. 29 In this, its initiaP° interpretation of the
constructive notice provision-i of the Federal Register Act
the Court likens administrative regulations to Statutes at
Large and concludes that since everyone is affected with
notice of statutes, so are they of regulations. Here again
the Court disregards contemporary realities 32 and interprets
29. The Federal Register Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U.
S. C. § 301 et seq. (1946), enacted to provide a centralized official compilation of documents, provides that the filing for publication with the
Division of the National Archives Establishment "of any document,
required or authorized to be published . . . shall, except in cases where

notice by publication is insufficient in law, be sufficient to give notice
...to any person subject thereto or affected thereby." 49 STAT. 502
(1935), 44 U. S. C. § 307 (1946). Those documents required to be published are: presidential proclamations and executive orders having general applicability and legal effect; documents which the president determines to have general applicability and legal effect; and such documents as are required to be published by act of congress. 49 STAT.
501 (1935), 44 U. S. C. § 305 (1946). The act was amended to require
periodic codifications of all documents having general applicability and
legal effect. 50 STAT. 304 (1937), 44 U. S. C. § 311 (1946). With the
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, additional material was required to be published for public information. 60 STAT.
238 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1002 (1946). Section 3 of that act provides that
with the exception of properly secret or internal management functions,
rules of organization, procedure and substance are to be published in
the Federal Register.
30. Lower federal courts have usually given the provision the traditional interpretation that "constructive notice" has the legal effect
of actual notice. See, e.g., Henderson v. Baldwin, 54 F. Supp. 438 (D.
C. Pa. 1942). But one case said that publication created a rebuttable
presumption of notice: Flannagan v. United States, 145 F.2d 740 (9th
Cir. 1944). See also Hall v. Chaltis, 31 A.2d 699 (D. C. Mun. App.
1943).
31. Section 7 of the Federal Register Act. See note 29 supra.
The provision is partly ambiguous, i.e., was the phrase "except in cases
where notice by publication is insufficient in law" merely thrown in
through excessive caution?
32. The legislative history shows that § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act stemmed from a congressional desire to provide
adequate public information. See, e.g., Mr. Walter's statement that
"The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure unanimously agreed that 'laymen and lawyers alike are baffled by a lack
of published information to which they can turn when confronted
with an administrative problem.' But the present situation is even
more serious than when those statements were made. Every member
of Congress is well aware of the difficulty of finding one's way about
in the maze of Federal agencies. That being so, the problem of the
92
citizen west of the Potomac is a hundredfold more difficult"
CONG. REC. 5755 (1946). Moreover, the final provision of the section
which relieves persons from any requirement to resort to organizational
or procedural rules not published in the Federal Register was included
to assure complete and reliable publication by the agency. See Justice
Department Memorandum, 92 CONG. REC. 3154 (1946): "If a person

435
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a modern statute regulating the relations of a farmer and
application of the ancient
his government by a mechanical
33
notion of "constructive notice."
This traditional interpretation of the word "notice" was
not inevitable; the opinion does not indicate that its wisdom or
desirability was considered. Nor is the rule of non-estoppel,
even if its applicability to the Merrill case be admitted, im-

mutable. A better method of decision lay open to the Courtone which would have accorded fully with its announced
principle of determining the incidence and extent of corporate liability in terms of congressional intention.
That method would first recognize that cases arising
under a federal administrative statute are to be governed by
the application of federal law.34 Where particular situations
are not covered by statute the Court must play its traditional
role by fashioning legal rules, establishing a federal common
law surrounding each statute.3 5 And the erection of such a
has actual notice of a rule he is bound by it. The only purpose of the
requirement for publication in the Federal Register is to make sure
that persons may find the necessary rules as to organization and procedure if they seek them. It goes without saying that actual notice
is the best of all notices. At most, the Federal Register gives constructive notice." The Court's rigid interpretation not only disregards
Congress' primary intention of providing a source of information, but
it also ignores the fact that this primary purpose has not been satisfactorily accomplished. See Wigmore, The Federal Register and Code
of Federal Regulations, 29 A. B. A. J. 10 (1943) where the point is
made that lawyers themselves have difficulty in obtaining and using
the Federal Register.

Compare GELLHORN, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW 136-

139 (2d ed. 1947).
33. That the phrase has never been either precise or of easy application, even in a particular area such as contracts, is illustrated by
the detailed treatment it is accorded in 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 399 et seq. (Bigelow's ed. 1886).
34. Not only is a federal corporation involved, but any rights of
action and any liabilities are federally created and federally regulated.
35. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943).
In deciding that the United States, as drawee, could recover from the
presenting bank on a check upon which the endorsement of the payee
was forged, the Court turned to federal sources of law. "When the
United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising
a constitutional function or power. .

.

.

The authority to issue the

check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United
States and was in no way dependent on the laws .. . of any ... state
. ...

In

absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the fed-

eral courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their
own standards." Id. at 366, 367. Compare NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111 (1944), where the Court defined "employee" on
the basis of federal law, viz. ". . . the terms and the purposes of the
statute, as well as the legislative history, [which] show that Congress
had in mind no . .. patchwork plan for securing freedom of employees'
organization and of collective bargaining. The Wagner Act is federal
legislation, administered by a national agency, intended to solve a
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body of case law should proceed upon the conscious premise
that gaps must be filled as the Court thinks the legislative
purpose and adjustment of the government-citizen relationship demand. The method advocated is not novel. Its pertinence was recognized, not only by the dissenters in the Merrill
case, 36 but implicitly by the majority as well. Having sought
congressional guidance in the organic act and having failed
7
to find it,3
the Court should have filled in the interstice
in accord with the necessities of the case. If the suability
clause, which the Court did not mention, could not reasonably
have been considered an exhaustive recital of the corporation's liability, the Court should then have determined that
liability by considering the entire factual background of government agricultural insurance and the likelihood of conflict
with the statutory scheme if liability were permitted. 8 Simnational problem on a national scale ....
It is an Act, therefore, in
reference to which it is not only proper, but necessary for us to
assume, 'in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, that
Congress

. . .

is not making the application of the federal act dependent

on state law.'" Id. at 123. See also United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U. S.301 (1947). The United States sued to recover amounts
it had spent on hospitalization and pay for a member of the armed
services injured through the negligence of one of defendant's truck
drivers. In holding -the defendant not liable to the government, the
Court stated the creati6n or negation of such liability was not a matter
of state law, but rather of federal law. Since the question was one of
federal policy, especially federal fiscal policy, the Court refrained from
creating a new liability in the nature of a tort. It did so because
"Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into law is a proper
subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours
.... Here the United States is the party plaintiff to the suit. And
the United States has power at any time to create the liability. The
only question is which organ of the Government is to make the determination that liability exists." Id. at 314, 316.
36. See Jackson, J.: "If crop insurance contracts made by agencies
of the United States Government are to be judged by the law of the
State in which they are written, I find no error in the court below. If,
however, we are to hold them subject only to federal law and to declare what that law is, I can see no reason why we should not adopt
a rule which recognizes the practicalities of the business." Federal
Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 386, 387 (1947).
(Douglas, J., joined in the dissent. Black and Rutledge, JJ., dissented
without opinion).
37. The Court, in repudiating the sovereign-proprietary distinction,
states that the corporation is not an ordinary commercial undertakingin part because private insurance companies do not engage in crop
insurance. This, the Court says, "reenforces the conclusion that the
rules of law whereby private insurance companies are rendered liable
for the acts of their agents are not bodily applicable to a Government
agency like the Corporation, unless Congress has so provided." Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 383 n.1 (1947).
This elliptical statement is the sole reference made regarding a search
for specific congressional directions in this particular statute.
38. Compare notes 26, 27, and 28 supra.
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ilarly, interpretation of the constructive notice provision of
the Federal Register Act should accord with the objectives
Congress had in mind not only when it provided generally for
publication of regulations but also when it established a
crop insurance corporation." If there is explicit awareness
that it is a new and ever more important government-citizen
relationship that is being adjudicated there may well be less
homage paid such symbols as "estoppel," "immunity," and
"cnotice."

TAXATION
GIFT TAXABILITY OF DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS
An increasing tendency to change spouses' has had
marked effect on federal tax administration.2 Particularly
39. Relaxing the rigidity of the "constructive notice" phrase
for purposes of the Merrill decision need not introduce uncertainty and
confusion with respect to that phrase and other material published
in the Federal Register. When the Court is again called upon to consider the legal effect of publication of other regulations, it should
frame its decision by correlating the pertinent statute, its history and
purpose, the regulations issued and the objectives which the Federal
Register was established to achieve. Congressional action would be
appropriate too, in that by classifying federal administrative activities
distinctions could be established in regard to the legal effect of publication of their regulations.
1. The trend is indicated by the estimated divorce rates compiled
by the National Office of Vital Statistics. The divorce rate per 1000
(of population) increased from 1.9 in 1937 to 3.6 in 1945. 23 VITAL
STATISTICS, Special Reports, No. 9, at 203 (1946).
2. Another tax problem in the divorce settlement area is the income taxability of payments by the husband to the wife. Section 22 (k),
INT. REv. CODE, in general, requires the wife to include in her income
periodic alimony payments. The wife must also include installment
payments under a lump-sum settlement if the payments are to be
made over a period of ten years or longer, to the extent that the installment for any tax year does not exceed 10% of the total obligation
of the husband. Section 23(u) allows the husband a deduction corresponding to § 22(k).
See U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.22(k)-1,
29.23(u)-i (1949). If the husband establishes a trust for his spouse
to discharge his marital obligations, the income from the trust likewise is taxable to the wife. INT. REV. CODE § 171(a).
Thus, the
marital settlement agreement must be drafted with regard to both the
income and gift taxes. That the settlement in the McLean case was
made wih due regard to the income taxability of the payments is evidenced by the provision that the husband's payments would be reduced
if they were not deductible. McLean case at p. 545.
Recent Indiana legislation allows the divorce or tax attorney
greater latitude than formerly in framing the settlement so as to take
advantage of tax-saving opportunities under both tax statutes. Ind.
Acts 1949, H.B. 401, provides that a divorce court may decree either
periodic alimony payments or a sum in gross. Prior statutes allowed

